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Gnostic Dilemmas in 
Western Psychologies of Spirituality
From the perspective of the sociology of worldreligions developed by Max Weber (1963), fig-ures such as Nietzsche, Emerson, Jung,
Heidegger, and Maslow—in their overlapping
attempts at a broadly “naturalistic” understanding of
spirituality—are exemplars of a contemporary “inner-
worldly” mysticism. It is “inner” or “this-worldly” in
terms of their attempts to understand an experiential
core of spirituality as a specifically human capacity.
Inner-worldly mysticisms are directly cultivated while
living within the everyday social world, in contrast to
the ashrams, monasteries, or caves of the classical
“other-worldly” mysticisms. Weber’s colleague Ernst
Troeltsch (1960) anticipated that naturalistically
understood inner-worldly mysticisms would emerge as
the “secret religion of the educated classes,” conse-
quent on the continuing secularization of the more
prophetically based, mainstream Judeo-Christian tra-
dition. This development is well illustrated in both
“New Age” spiritualities and in the emergence of
transpersonal psychology itself (Hunt, 2003). 
To paraphrase Weber on the Protestant
Reformation as one source of the “spirit of capital-
ism,”we could now say that just as historical capitalism
needed the ethical attitude to one’s vocation as sacred,
so our current society of individuals, autonomous and
separate to the point of isolation, may not be fully live-
able without the sense of presence, felt reality, or Being
cultivated by the more contemplative spiritual tradi-
tions. However inevitable and needed this develop-
ment, such a direct consciousness of the immediacy of
Being seems especially vulnerable to the emotional
trauma and frustration attendant on any radical per-
sonal openness in the midst of a less than supportive
utilitarian society—and especially where vulnerabili-
ties in sense of self and self esteem are so widespread.
Weber, for instance, spoke of the attitude of “broken
humility” associated with inner-worldly spirituality,
while Jung saw dangers of a defensive, compensatory
“inflation” in modern self-realization. It may not be an
accident that recent transpersonal psychology has been
increasingly exploring the close interrelationship
between spiritual experience and character “meta-
pathologies” related to narcissistic grandiosity, schizoid
withdrawal, and despair (Almaas, 1988; Hunt, 1998,
2000, 2003).
Inner-worldly mysticism in the modern west has
its historical “shadow” in Hellenistic Gnosticism, for
Weber the multifaceted spiritual response of disenfran-
chised educated classes to Roman hegemony. “Gnosis”
comes from the Greek Nous—for intelligence/univer-
sal mind—and referred to a knowing of the divine by
direct experience and acquaintance rather than by any
received doctrine. Its various forms include but are
hardly exhausted by the Egyptian Hermeticists, het-
erodox Christian Valentinians, Persian Manichees, and
heretical Sethians. Its multiple forms are so diverse that
some have doubted whether Gnosticism could have
any defining essence (Williams, 1996). Indeed, some
Jungian scholars have rather loosely generalized the
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term into an equivalent of any directly experiential
inner-worldly spirituality (Avens, 1984; Segal, 1995).
Yet in his Enneads, Plotinus, the very exemplar of a
fully developed Neo-Platonic unitive mysticism, was
clear that the “so-called Gnostics” represented a “some-
thing” he did not like, based on a spiritual pathology
of psychic inflation—which in hindsight may well
indicate some of the difficulties of expanding con-
sciousness while in the everyday social world of
Roman rule. Perhaps it is not so different today.
In contrast to the all-inclusive One or Absolute of
Plotinus, the Gnostics, to the extent we can generalize
about them in the manner of Jonas (1963) or Filoramo
(1990), were thoroughly dualist. The creation of the
world and ordinary humanity is the work of a
Demiurge—a lesser god variously characterized as
malevolent, demented, or simply ignorant. The task of
the Gnostic adept—the pneumatic—is to bypass this
lesser god of lower humanity and regain his/her origi-
nal condition as a pure being of light on the level of
the Absolute. This original human condition is alter-
nately understood as the primal Anthropos and/or the
spiritual nature of Adam and Eve before the Fall. Most
Gnostic groups provided elaborate mytho-poetic
accounts and secret rituals to bypass the cosmos of the
lower creator god in visionary states and after death.
The result, in terms of the ordinary social world, was a
nihilist and essentially paranoid attitude and a personal
elitism and grandiosity of self—what Maslow (1971)
would later term spiritual “metapathologies” and
William James (1902) “theopathies.” We will see later
how similar frustrations are implicit within contempo-
rary New Age “idealizations” of a world-rejecting
“transcendence” and in the parallel psychologies of its
corresponding “new science.”
Some Specimens of Gnostic
Vulnerability and Metapathology
1) Consider first the Judaic books of Enoch, ranging
between 100 B.C. to perhaps 400 A.D., and often seen
as precursors to the early Kabbalah. Here it is as if a
layer of visionary shamanism has been laid over the
more prophetic tradition of the Old Testament. Enoch
is suddenly raised through the seven heavens to behold
Yahweh face to face, which would of course have anni-
hilated even Moses. To ensure that ordinary mortals
later seeing Enoch will not themselves be destroyed by
his necessarily transformed visage, which must other-
wise mirror the sight of Yahweh, his face is first frozen
by an angel of ice. God then uses him to rebuke the
angels as now lesser than this fullest potential of natu-
ral humanity. Later Enoch is also shown Satan and the
fallen angelic “watchers,” who had sinned with human
women and brought forth giants. These are impris-
oned in the lower heavens. By Enoch II, Enoch has
been raised permanently to the heavens as the “son of
man,” while in Enoch III he has become Metatron—
the lesser Yahweh—and finally presides with God over
heaven and earth (Charlesworth, 1983).
This typically Gnostic equation of humanity and
God is also echoed in Egyptian Hermeticism in
increasingly grandiose terms:
For the human is a godlike living thing, not compa-
rable to other living things of the earth but to those
in heaven above, who are called gods. Or better—if
one dare tell the truth—the one who is really
human is above these gods as well....For none of the
heavenly gods will go down to earth, leaving behind
the bounds of heaven, yet the human rises up to
heaven and takes its measure....Therefore, we must
dare to say that the human on earth is a mortal god
but that the god in heaven is an immortal human.
(In Copenhaver, 1992, p. 36)
2) It is but a short step from Enoch and the Hermetic
Anthropos to the Sethians, Ophites, and Barbélites
(Layton, 1987). The creator god is now a Satan-like
monster, Ialdabaoth, who creates the world and most
of humanity out of his demented ignorance and delu-
sional omnipotence. Sophia (Barbélo), the feminine
aspect of the light of the Absolute, so the elaborate
mytho-poesis goes, finds herself temporarily separated
from the One. Out of her sense of loneliness and aban-
donment, she creates a new being entirely out of her-
self, i.e. narcissistically. Because of her separation from
the Absolute, this turns out to be the monster,
Ialdabaoth, with the head of a lion and a body of ser-
pents—perhaps itself a satire of the Roman Mithra.
Horrified by her creation she flings it into the abyss.
Coming to himself, Ialdabaoth assumes he is omnipo-
tent but alone and so creates his own cosmos, with the
archons, or planetary gods, to help in its rule, and
human beings as a replica of himself—in some
accounts creating Eve first, in others Adam.
Accordingly, the first human is made of clay and
wormlike, but Sophia secretly imbues and redeems it
with her higher pneuma. Dimly sensing her inner
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superiority, Ialdabaoth and his Archons pursue Eve
and rape her, thereby giving rise to Cain and Abel. The
pure pneuma of Eve escapes into the serpent, in these
satiric inversions of Genesis, who later instructs her as
to her true spiritual nature—thus the Ophites, or ser-
pent worshippers. 
Meanwhile only Seth and his descendants are
truly born of the higher Adam and Eve, so only these
are predestined in terms of their pneuma to ascend to
the level of the Anthropos and reunite with the
Absolute. All other human beings are thereby of a
lower order and lost, remaining under the sway of
Ialdabaoth, who in a later terminology is the equiva-
lent of a Satanic ruler of the world—all this in hyper-
detailed versions of what Jung would term “active
imagination.” The “deficitly motivated” non-Sethians,
in other words, lack the genetic capacity for any full
Maslowian “self actualization” or Jungian individua-
tion.
3) The key distinctions, then, for the later Christian
Valentinians, as with the Sethians, become those
between the spiritually elect “pneumatics,” vs. the
more ordinary “psychics”—who can have no direct
experience of the numinous but only an indirect access
through the ethical teachings of the Bible—vs. the
lowest “people of clay.” Pneumatics are already pure
and so not bound by ordinary ethics—in Nietzsche’s
later version they are “beyond good and evil.” No con-
duct can sully such inherent purity, as reflected in the
words of Ptolomy, the major student of Valentinius:
Just as the element that consists in “dust” cannot
have a share in salvation—for …it is not capable of
receiving it—so also the spiritual element …cannot
receive corruption, no matter what sorts of behavior
it has come to pass its time in company with. For a
piece of gold does not lose its beauty when it is put
into filth but rather keeps its own nature, since the
filth cannot harm the gold. (Layton, 1987, p. 294)
Thus follow the “antinomian” tendencies of at least
some of the Gnostics, so notorious to both Plotinus
and the early Church Fathers (Jonas, 1963;
LaCarriere, 1989). They proclaimed themselves free of
traditional ethics, as in Simon Magus, who wandered
through Palestine in the years after the death of Jesus,
accompanied by Helena, an ex-prostitute whom he
claimed to be the incarnation of Sophia, and preach-
ing free love as the closest earthly parallel to the realms
of light. There would be echoes of similar accusations
with the medieval Brethren of the Free Spirit and the
later heretical Ranters and Levellers of the English civil
war (Cohn, 1961).
4) Related suspicions of “libertinism”—the sexual
acting out of spirituality—were directed toward
Valentinus and his “mystery of the bridal chamber”.
This was the sacred marriage of the adept’s pneuma—
considered here as feminine—with one’s correspon-
ding male angel, thereby undoing the separation of
Adam and Eve and reconstituting the original spirit of
humanity as the Christos. It is unclear in these hetero-
dox Christian groups whether this “sacred marriage”
remained an interior symbolic imagination, a purely
ritual expression, and/or an actual ceremonial sexuality.
We will see a similar ambiguity in Jung’s 1920s under-
standing of the inner marriage of anima and animus as
constituting the higher, individuated Self.
From the point of view of the unitive, nondual
mysticism of Plotinus, those he called Gnostics were
unwittingly enshrining and fixating a spiritual pathol-
ogy. He sees them as under the sway of Narcissus,
when the more appropriate model would be
Odysseus—who on completing his worldly task sim-
ply turns and sails for Ithaca as his true home. Plotinus
locates in Gnosticism a grandiosity—or in Jung’s terms
an “ego inflation”—that will block the humility and
surrender needed for the full numinous experience of
an all-unifying Absolute:
We must not exalt ourselves in a boorish way, but
with moderation, and without raising ourselves
higher up than our nature is able to make us rise; we
must not rank ourselves alone after God, but recog-
nize that there is room for other beings in his pres-
ence....If a person who had been previously hum-
ble...were to hear “You are the son of God; those
others, whom you used to hold in awe, are not sons
of God”...then do you really think other people are
going to join in the chorus? (Plotinus, The Enneads,
in Hadot, 1993, p. 67)
Plotinus also attacks the Gnostics for their dualism,
which leaves them paradoxically over-involved in the
very social world they would flee as a cosmos of pure
evil. For them the starry night is an emblem of evil, in
contrast to the more inclusive pantheism of Plotinus,
wherein the beauty of nature foreshadows the higher
aesthetic impact of Divine Light. For Plotinus,
Gnosticism is an incomplete spirituality that necessar-
ily imbalances its followers.
Jung too acknowledged the dangers of inflation
and splitting as attendant on contemporary spiritual
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self-realization, which certainly did not mean he him-
self escaped them. The classicist Arthur Darby Nock
(1972) locates a similar danger: For all the Gnostic
claims of the experience of mystery—the willingness
to abide in not-knowing and ineffability since the full
numinous is outside all categories—they are curiously
lacking in “negative capability.” The heavens are
instead astonishingly hyper-detailed, with ornate
mythologies of Sophia, intricately nested levels, evil
archons, and bridal chambers. Jung had spoken of the
ease of confusing ego and self in self-realization, and
the Gnostics often show an active imagination over-
specified to the point of delusive paranoia. Mytho-
poetic imagination and transpersonal states certainly
open awareness, but also have the potential for an
unintended expression and expansion of ego, thereby
enshrining the anxiety over dissolution (Rank, 1941)
and defensive schizoid hatred (Guntrip, 1968) that are
at its contracted core. Accordingly it may not be too
extreme to see in the elitism and insistent dualism of
some Gnostics a “metaphysics of hate.”
Manifestations of Gnosticism in 
Early America: 
Anne Hutchinson,  
Puritan “Antinomian”  
and R.W. Emerson, 
The First Transpersonal Psychologist
Harold Bloom (1992,1996), who also traces exten-sive parallels between Gnosticism and contem-
porary “new age” spirituality, sees an incipient Gnostic
element throughout early American religiosity. From
Joseph Smith and Mary Baker Eddy to Pentecostal
glossolalia and snake handling sects, there is the ten-
dency to pass over “the Book” in favor of immediately
transcendent states—by implication leaving Satan, like
Ialdabaoth, to preside over all that is merely of the
world.
Our Gnostic predilections began well before the
LSD-like death-rebirth paroxysms of the tent revivals
and “great Awakening” of the 1740s. They surface first
in Puritan Massachusetts in 1637 with the heresy trial
of Anne Hutchinson before the ministers and civil
government of the Bay Colony (Adams, 1965). In
what seems to have been a latter-day pneumatic heresy,
Hutchinson, a charismatic figure who might today be
seen as strikingly high on the personality trait of
“imaginative absorption,” drew her own conclusions
from the more radical forms of Protestantism soon to
fuel the Ranters and Quakers. It is only the inner light
of God’s Grace, whose aura she could sense in herself
and see in others, that determines who is saved and
who not. To their extreme annoyance, all but two of
the Massachusetts town ministers turned out to be
mere “preparationists,” teaching only a Covenant of
Works and Faith rather than an inwardly illuminated
Covenant of predestined Grace. These became, so to
speak, the Massachusetts equivalents of Valentinian
“psychics,” restricted to only the derived sprituality of
the Bible. For Hutchinson, as she was finally goaded
into directly stating at her bullying, hectoring trial,
most of the local ministers had “only” the understand-
ing of the Apostles before the final direct teachings of
Christ—i.e. after the Resurrection (Hutchinson,
1936). Dubbed an “antinomian” by the outraged cler-
ics, she believed that the soul of man dissolves at death,
much as with animals. Only the living spirit of Christ
within is saved, where the “inner light” reveals its presence.
Of course they expelled her and a small like-minded
group, from whom she later split as well, after she had
re-settled in a more tolerant Rhode Island. Her trial
paved the way for Boston’s later executions of the
Quakers and the Salem witch trials. Perhaps actually
confirming her views of them, the Massachusetts min-
isters finally settled for a compromise “half-way”
Covenant for full church membership, in the face of
lower and lower church attendance as the younger
generations fell demonstrably short of the “living
saints” status of the first emigrants. That did not pre-
vent, however, the worthy ministers from declaring the
later massacre of Anne Hutchinson and her children at
the hands of rebelling Indians a “Providence of God”
and so rechristening her “the American Jezebel,” based
on the original Jezebel’s Old Testament annihilation.
From the present perspective, we could say that
Ralph Waldo Emerson drew the fuller conclusions of
Hutchinson’s pneumatic protest. Still a young man, he
resigned his Boston ministry on concluding that there
could have been no original Fall, and so there was no
need for a redemption in Christ. Each of us in our
heart is already the potentially perfect Adam/Eve
(Emerson, 1940abc). There is something God-like in
anyone who completely trusts their own immediate
experience. This cultivation of an immediate con-
sciousness of Being in each situation—very much in
anticipation of Heidegger—is the closest we can come
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to God. Indeed, our own individual experience, totally
trusted without reservation, is the most direct expres-
sion of Divinity. The ecstasies marking that realiza-
tion—and he describes his own as “volcanic”
(Richardson, 1995)—are naturalistic states, as later
with Nietzsche, Jung, and Maslow. Anticipating cur-
rent chaos modeling of the brain, these states are a res-
onance within us to the dynamic principles of flow in
nature (Emerson, 1963). Every person in this dawning
“age of the first person singular” is thus potentially a
pneumatic, however rare must be the total giving over
of oneself to the expansive fullness of our immediate
experience. Emerson, here, with Plotinus, does avoid
the Gnostic view of nature as evil, and anticipates also
the later Jung—recovered from his own excesses of the
1920s and 30s—who found in the dynamic patterns
of alchemy a mirror approximating the totality of Self.
Yet in this view that human consciousness fully
realized is God, there are also echoes of the Gnostic
Anthropos and its incipient inflation and world rejection:
A man is a god in ruins.…Man is the dwarf of him-
self. Once he was permeated and dissolved by spir-
it. He filled nature with his overflowing currents.
Out from him sprang the sun and the moon.…The
laws of his mind …externalized themselves into day
and night, into the year and the seasons. But having
made for himself this huge shell, his waters retired;
he no longer fills the veins and veinlets; he is shrunk
to a drop. He sees that the structure still fits him,
but fits him colossally. Say, rather, once it fitted
him.…Yet sometimes he starts in his slumber, and
wonders at himself and his house, and muses
strangely at the resemblance betwixt him and it.
(Emerson, 1963, p. 35)
Here may be the first broadly naturalistic restatement
of Gnosticism—a relation to become more obvious in
Nietzsche, Jung, Maslow, and transpersonal psycholo-
gy. What makes this Gnosticism is our de facto indis-
tinguishability, as human persons, from the
Absolute—to the extent that our consciousness is fully
open. Yet note the paradox: how can we, as beings also
finite, and this even at our most expanded and ful-
filled, be that numinous which phenomenologically at
least is felt exactly to utterly encompass and transcend
us? Is there not a potential temptation here to the




The ambiguity fully emerges with Nietzsche, who
cites Emerson as one of his few precursors, and had a
direct influence on the understanding of self actualization
in Jung and Maslow. For Nietzsche, the Judeo-
Christian God is dead, along with all other nonper-
spectival conceptual absolutes. Yet since that God was
a projection of our own nature, the way is also open
for a more direct, naturalistically understood re-
engagement of the energies of the ecstatic states that
once conferred a sense of meaning and purpose in our
existence.
Where is God gone?...we have killed him,  you and
I....Has it not become colder? does not night come
on continually darker and darker? How shall we
console ourselves?...Is not the magnitude of this
deed too great for us? Shall we not ourselves have to
become Gods, merely to seem worthy of it?
(Nietzsche, 1960, pp. 167–168)
It is the overman—the creative individual of the
future—who will evoke the ecstatic experience at the
core of all religion and its inherent “yes” to the totali-
ty of Being and Becoming, but without projecting that
into a supernatural realm. Instead these states are to be
understood as the highest capacity of the human
being—become thereby a naturalistic Anthropos.
Behold I teach you the overman. The overman is the
meaning of the earth. Let your will say: the overman
shall be the meaning of the earth. I beseech you, my
brothers, remain faithful to the earth, and do not
believe those who speak to you of other-worldly
hopes. (Nietzsche, 1954, p. 125)
Indeed, Nietzsche called for a “physiology of ecstasy,”
and might well have been fascinated with the era of
laboratory LSD research. The living God is within the
brains and bodies of those who projected it, and so the
energy of that pure aliveness can be reappropriated and
experienced directly—as the expression of a “higher”
humanity. This will be the new creative elite for
Nietzsche—the path for latter day pneumatics.
Here is the core of the Gnostic paradox and dilemma:
If we follow Rudolf Otto’s (1958) purely descriptive
phenomenology of the numinous—as the cross-cul-
tural experiential source of spirituality—then
Nietzsche’s “ecstasy” is the felt encounter with a “wholly
other,” sensed but ineffable, and so beyond us in pure
mystery and unknowing. How can that be understood
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as human? How do we experience the numinous as us,
without thereby sliding into the inflation and narcissis-
tic distortion of the Gnostics? Certainly Jung (1988)
found a worrisome defensive inflation in Nietzsche’s
idealized figure of Zarathustra as overman. 
There is a similarly split and dualistic idealization
in Maslow’s portrait of the “self actualizer,” who has
transcended all ordinary, henceforth “deficit,” motiva-
tion. Maslow (1971) cited Nietzsche as a major influ-
ence, and late in his life admitted that his portrayal of
Being-values was in part a reaction against his hated
mother—ascribing to his self-actualizer the opposite of
all the features of a mother he despised with a passion
reminiscent of Nietzsche’s own hatred toward his sister
and mother. Maslow describes his reactions:
I was a terribly unhappy boy....My family was a mis-
erable family and my mother was a horrible creature
...I grew up in libraries and among books, without
friends. With my childhood, it’s a wonder I’m not
psychotic. (Hoffman, 1988, p. 1)
I’ve always wondered where my utopianism,...stress
on kindness, love, friendship ...came from. I knew
certainly of the direct consequences of having no
mother-love. But the whole thrust of my life philos-
ophy ...has its roots in a hatred for and revulsion
against everything she stood for. (Lowry, 1982, p. 245)
There is a similar split in both Maslow and
Nietzsche between an inner doubt and despair and a
rhapsodical, Dionysian affirmation. Maslow was also
tempted, like Nietzsche, to view his self
actualizer/overman as showing the marks of “superior
biological specimens” (Maslow, 1971)—positing a
pneumatic superiority of genetics and temperament. It
is this split between transcendence and ordinary living
that also predisposes to the moral ambiguities of spiri-
tual antinomianism—a would-be “beyond good and
evil” that is actually their confusion and inversion.
The Gnostic Dilemmas of Carl Jung
Already the childhood dreams and visions depictedin Jung’s autobiographical Memories, Dreams,
Reflections (1961) had put Jung into direct contact
with a lower god of both good and evil. He was right
to call his psychology of the 1920s “Gnostic,” as his
explicit equation of a higher, integrated Self with the
Anthropos makes clear (Jung, 1959). On a more per-
sonal level, there were his “self-deification” experi-
ences, in the visionary crisis period after his split from
Freud, in which he experienced himself as Abraxas, the
Demiurge of the Gnostic Basilides—hermaphroditic,
lion-headed, and encircled by serpents (Jung, 1989).
Some of the published reactions in Jungian circles
to the curious books of Richard Noll (1994, 1997),
who describes Jung’s group in the 1920s as a
“Nietzschean cult,” seem oversimplified (Grimaldi-
Craig, 1998; Shamdasani, 1998)—part of an unfortu-
nate attempt to sanitize Jung and thereby miss the
deep conflicts that such a this-worldly spirituality
must inevitably face. Of course Noll does hate Jung,
and he unfairly omits Jung’s own view of his struggle
with inflation. Yet if we set aside four or five para-
graphs of pure character assassination from each book,
we are left with much of value on the cultural context
of both the early Jung circle and his own initial
attempts to develop a naturalistic psychology of a
numinous/archetypal imagination. Some current
Jungians are indeed embarrassed by this earlier, wilder
Jung of the 1920s and 1930s, but that period both
attests to the tensions within the naturalistic inner-
worldly mysticism that is our topic and was the prelude
to his later more fully realized approach to a unitive
spirituality. Noll of course allows the term “cult” in his
text to be taken in an ostensibly pejorative fashion,
while also mentioning that he intends it in the manner
of contemporary sociologists, influenced by Troeltsch,
who divide “new religious movements” between
“sects”—reviving prophetical fundamentalism—and
mystical “cults.” The latter usage is indeed based on
their direct experiential emphasis and an etymological
root based on the imagery of organic growth (as in
“cultivation”) (Dawson, 1998).
So Jung’s early circle was a kind of Nietzschean
cult—more specifically a Gnostic one. Like much con-
temporary transpersonal psychology, there was both a
personal and group cultivation of the “transcendent
function” and an attempt at an empirical, and so
broadly scientific, understanding of “the God image in
the human psyche.” The contemporary equivalent of
Jungian “psychics” remain uncomfortable with the
antinomian tendencies of those years and the false
grandiosity of an unleashed archetypal imagination.
Indeed there were casualties. First, there was Jung’s
own equivalent of the Valentinian bridal chamber,
conducted both symbolically and physically in his
specially built stone tower with several apparent
paramours, muse figures, and/or externalized anima
personifications. Whatever we end up thinking of this
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period, we must be less sanguine about the imitation
of Jung undertaken with the latter’s active encourage-
ment by the influential Harvard psychologist Henry
Murray and Christiana Morgan in their own stone
tower in Massachusetts. However begun, it ended in
sado-masochistic ritual and her ultimate suicide
(Douglas, 1993).
If it is true that the “shadow,” in Jung’s terminol-
ogy, must first be directly known and experienced in
order to be assimilated and truly integrated into a
more inclusive and balanced Self, there is no point in
any “half way covenant” seeking to turn Jung, as natu-
ralistic pneumatic, into a contemporary clinical psy-
chologist. With Valentinius and Basilides, Jung had
concluded that metabolizing the shadow-side of Self
required a knowledge of direct acquaintance: So in the
Valentinian Gospel of Phillip we find:
Let each of us burrow for the root of evil that is
within....It will be rooted up when it is recognized.
But if we are ignorant of it, it sinks its root within
us, and yields its crops within our hearts; dominates
us; we are its slaves....Lack of acquaintance is a slave;
acquaintance is freedom....If we join with [the
truth], it will receive our fullness. (Layton, 1987, p. 352)
Meanwhile, in a late letter to his Jewish colleague
Erich Neumann, Jung says:
It is certain that no one is redeemed from a sin he
has not committed, and that a man who stands on
a peak cannot climb it. The humiliation allotted to
each of us is implicit in his character. If he seeks his
wholeness seriously, he will stray unawares into the
hole destined for him, and out of this darkness the
light will arise. (Jung, 1975, 34–35)
It was Jung’s own unconscious indulgence of shadow
in the mid 1930s that had exposed his own character
in just this way.
Jung’s initial response to Nazism during these
years found him embroiled in a historically significant
struggle with grandiosity, antinomian shadow, and an
ego imbued over-specificity of archetypal imagination.
Emerson’s comment on the highly elaborated visions
of Swedenbourg seems appropriate here: “It is danger-
ous to sculpture these evanescing images of thought.
True in transition they become false if fixed”
(Emerson, 1912, p. 65). This may be clear enough in
UFO abduction cults, past life regressions, and astral
travel scenarios in out-of-body experience, but it man-
ifested more fatefully in Jung’s combination of his
early self-deification experiences with his theory of a
“collective unconscious” as having “ancestral” and
“racial” levels. Jung later overcame this Lamarckian
biologism by recasting his collective unconscious as
“objective psyche,” with its cross-cultural parallels
based on universal features of physical metaphor—
much as with Emerson himself. But from the late
1920s through the mid 1930s his “racial” psychology
lent itself to a romanticized Nazi ideology, to which he
himself was briefly drawn.
Fascinated by his own pagan and gnostic visionary
experiences and captured by a false biologism that
would root all this in an ancestral unconscious, it was
but a small step—supported by the same pan
Germanic volkische romanticism that for a time also
drew Heidegger—to basing archetypal identity on race:
The differences which actually do exist between
Germanic and Jewish psychology and which have
long been known to every intelligent person are no
longer to be glossed over, and this can only be ben-
eficial to science. (Jung, 1933, p. 533)
Because ...of their civilization more than twice as
ancient as ours, [the Jews] are vastly more conscious
than we of human weaknesses, of the shadow-side
of things....The “Aryan” unconscious, on the other
hand, contains explosive forces and seeds of a future
yet to be born....The still youthful Germanic peo-
ples are fully capable of creating new cultural forms
that still lie dormant in the darkness of the uncon-
scious of every individual—seeds bursting with energy
and capable of mighty expansion. (Jung, 1934, p.
165–166)
Jung’s persistence in these comments into the mid
1930s shows a complex mix of political naivete,
opportunism in taking on the presidency of the
Nazified society for psychotherapy for which the first
quotation was written, and an unconscious inflation
whose later understanding led him to describe the sec-
ond quotation as “embarrassing nonsense” and say of
the whole episode: “I slipped up.” Jung’s Germanic
unconscious brought forth a Faustian element in his
own development which by 1936 he understood
enough to diagnose more accurately in its political
manifestations:
The impressive thing about the German phenome-
non is that one man, who is obviously “possessed,”
has infected a whole nation to such an extent that
everything is set in motion and has started rolling
on its course towards perdition. (Jung, 1936, p. 185)
Certainly Jung was not personally anti-Semitic, and he
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did later help Jewish colleagues to escape Germany,
but his overall obtuseness attests to his own collusion
with shadow—to his own inflation and splitting—
which to their credit contemporary Jungians have led
the way in documenting and understanding
(Maidenbaum & Martin, 1991).
The ultimate proof, however, and contra Noll,
that Jung’s was not simply a fascist spirituality is that
there actually was such a thing—a hyper-specified
Gnostic mytho-poesis of Aryan occultism (Goodrick-
Clarke, 1985). Happily it bore no similarity to Jung’s
thoughts, even at its most oracular—as in his visionary
“Sermons to the Dead” (1961). Instead, we find a kind
of archetypal imagination gone wild in paranoia and
hatred, and best illustrated, in passing, by Himmler’s
favorite, Karl Maria Wiligut. Wiligut was an aristocrat
and hero of World War I, whose trance visions revealed
him to be the last descendant of ancient Aryan sages.
His ancestral memories went back to 228,000 B.C.,
when there were three suns in the sky, giants, dwarfs,
and Aryan God-men. As head of the “Prehistoric
Research Division of the S.S.,” Wiligut dispatched
suitably attuned teams for confirmatory trance-chan-
neling at various Teutonic ruins—in short, a Jungian
“active imagination” practised by the grandiose and
deeply disturbed.
Much of this Nazi occultism rested on the earlier
visions of Lanz von Liebenfels, which revealed the pre-
historic struggle between Aryan God-men, gifted then
with clairvoyant and telepathic powers, and various
“sub-men” or “ape-lings.” These latter subverted Aryan
purity by means of erotically gifted “love pygmies,”
leading to a fatal inter-breeding and a loss of the
spiritual powers of this Aryan Anthropos. Only the
extermination of racial inferiors and careful genetic
engineering could restore Aryan purity. Nonetheless,
Lanz von Liebenfels deserves our grudging respect for
the title, at least, of his 1905 masterwork: Theozoology:
The Lure of the Sodom Ape-lings and the Electron of the
Gods. Apparently it was the pineal glands of the Old
Aryans that contained the n-rays (x-rays having been
recently discovered) that gave them their omniscient
powers. Thousands belonged to such groups, while
apparently not enough laughed. Instead these would-
be Aryan pneumatics anticipated ascension past mere
biological “psychics”—to be tolerated or enslaved—
and lower people of clay—to be exterminated. In their
baroque excess these myths are the closest modern
equivalent to the Sethians and Ophites. The fixed
specificity of their imagery is as far as possible from
Jung’s (1959) later insight that the realized Self could
only be “circumambulated,” but never attained.
Gnostic Ambiguities in Current
Personality and Neuropsychological
Research on Spirituality
It may be that the inflation, splitting, and ethical
ambiguity endemic in the various gnosticisms must re-
emerge in any naturalistic, empirical understanding of
spirituality as a human capacity. The spiritual implica-
tions of recent research on the psychology and neu-
ropsychology of transpersonal states, while obviously
better science, may not be as far from n-rays of the
pineal gland, and their all-too-human control, as we
might wish.
Current personality research locates
numinous/archetypal experience as the furthest devel-
opment of one major pole of individual difference
widely termed “imaginative absorption” (Tellegen &
Atkinson, 1974), as the directly experiential dimen-
sion of a broader “openness to experience” (McCrae,
1994) and with its opposite pole an attitude of valuing
practicality and utility over immediate states of con-
sciousness. Lower levels of absorption would be related
to sensation and thrill seeking and drug experimenta-
tion, higher levels to aesthetics, vivid dreaming, and
proclivity to spontaneous altered and transpersonal
states, while its highest expression would be the sense
of the numinous described by James, Otto, and Jung.
Recent questionnaire-based attempts to establish spir-
ituality as its own separate dimension find its directly
experiential component most related to various meas-
ures of “absorption” and “openness” (MacDonald,
2000; Piedmont, 1999). High levels of
absorption/openness have two faces: a positive, inte-
grative one as “mysticism” and a negative one as “dis-
sociation”—where absorption overlaps with measures
of neuroticism and psychoticism (Hunt et al, 2002).
Personality research has come to see absorption/open-
ness as one of the major three or five dimensions needed
to describe individual variability statistically. For
Eysenck (1995) these are introversion-extraversion,
neuroticism, and creativity/psychoticism—as the posi-
tive and negative forms of openness. For Costa and
McCrae (1995; McCrae, 1994) they are introver-
sion–extraversion, neuroticism, openness, agreeable-
ness, and conscientiousness—each with some genetic
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component. Our Gnostic pneumatics then can be
understood as strikingly high on absorption/openness,
valuing the fullest unfolding of consciousness for its
own sake and above all else. Jung was such a person—
with his early childhood dreams and visions perhaps
illustrating its genetic component. So also were
Emerson, Nietzsche, Anne Hutchinson—commenting
on the missing auras of the Massachusetts ministers—
and more unfortunately, Karl Maria Wiligut.
This research presents us with an updated version
of the Gnostic dilemma: First, it makes spirituality real
in terms of its effects on experience, and so as some-
thing utterly human. It is then like any other dimen-
sion of human cognitive faculties and individual dif-
ferences—like introversion-extraversion. Second, and
especially given our culture’s strong value of creativity
and its imaginal components, it makes high absorp-
tion an elite (pneumatic) temperament—restricted to
some and not others. Finally it makes
absorption/openness antinomian—with no essential
relation between this generic, bipolar experiential core
of spirituality and any particular values or ethics. In
other words, of these five, or three, dimensions, either
end of any other dimension can be associated with the
highest levels of absorption/openness, i.e. with highest
or lowest neuroticism, with highest introversion or
extraversion, with highest social agreeableness or its
paranoid opposite, and with conscientiousness or its
sociopathic opposite. We see then not only the possi-
bility of a Jesus—lowest neuroticism, and highest
extraversion, agreeableness, and conscientiousness, if
that be not too absurd—but also of the revolutionary
Ranters—and Charles Manson.2
Neither the traditionally religious nor the anti-
religious want to hear this. For the religious, spiritual-
ity has been made into a faculty, a cognitive-affective
process—the all-encompassing and transcendent
reduced to a variation on the merely human. Yet the
anti-religious should find just as deep an implicit
offense: From a naturalistic perspective, the numinous
is utterly real in terms of its human effects, both as a
self-validating experiential state whose impact affects
the sense of purpose and meaning  in life for individ-
uals and societies, and as an empirical phenomenon
open to scientific study—as James and Jung originally
stated. Antireligious humanists are thus forced to treat
spirituality as a central part of the human life they so
value. It is not something that can simply go away
through “rationally” chosen disbelief.
Current neurophysiological research showing a
shifting activation in the temporal and parietal regions
of the neocortex, especially in the right hemisphere,
associated with spontaneous ecstatic states and deep
meditative states has similarly Gnostic implications.
Of course the era of LSD research had already implied
that God, in addition to being Jung’s “God image in
the human psyche,” was also “in” biochemical brain
processes probably related most directly to dopamine,
but because of our present cultural valuation of all
things neurophysiological these more recent findings
have received widespread popular attention. It seems
to be DMT—the “spirit molecule”—that is now
secreted by the pineal gland (Strassman et al., 1994).
The Globe and Mail, a Toronto newspaper, began
a recent article, “Is God all in the brain?” as follows:
God lives somewhere in the temporal and parietal
lobes of the brain, along with aliens, angels and
dead relatives. To find them at home, put on
Michael Persinger’s God helmet and ring their door-
bells with a magnetic buzz. This is neurotheology—
the scientific mapping, understanding and accessing
of the location of spirituality in the brain. Even
more boldly, it is an exploration of what it takes to
prod God into action. (Valpy, August 25, 2001, p. F7)
Persinger’s (1987) research on ecstatic states had found
lower arousal, EEG theta patterns, and subthreshold
seizure-like spiking in and around the right temporal
lobe, which he also induces experimentally with a hel-
met applying electro-magnetic fields to these areas.
While Persinger’s work is avowedly reductionist,
understanding spirituality as a kind of illusion based
on a neural anxiety buffer, Andrew Newberg and
Eugene d’Aquili (2000) reach a more complex under-
standing in their related work on the role of the right
parietal regions—associated with spatial patterning
and body image—in ecstatic states. In a cover story in
Newsweek (May 7, 2001) titled” “God and the brain:
How we’re wired for spirituality,” Newberg insists that
it is an open and undeterminable question whether
lower levels of parietal activation simply cause mystical
experiences of dissolution of self into space and light,
or instead allow us to perceive the spiritual reality to
which they refer. I have written similarly of my own
cognitive model of transpersonal experiences as based
on complex or abstract synesthesias that exteriorize the
(largely parietal) cross-modal translation processes at
the core of all intelligence, but here expressed presen-
tationally and for their own sake—rather than in the
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more instrumental forms of ordinary representational
intelligence (Hunt, 1995).
Yet if we accept the spirit of these recent “theories”
of the transpersonal and posit some sort of “spirituality
module” in the brain—and one that can be directly
stimulated—are we not also returned to an updated
version of Gnostic paradox and all its metapathologi-
cal risks and ambiguities? For we are then positing a
potential scientific and personal control over a capacity
to attune experientially to that which utterly and
intrinsically encompasses us—as outside any control as
the mystery of Being itself. This is Gnosticism cubed:
Not only does western science in its understanding of
the very principles of creation thereby rise above the
Demiurge, but now the response to the ultimate mys-
tery of Being itself becomes a human capacity with
human cause and effect. A new vision of
Anthropos/overman arises: the self-stimulating master
of the “God response.” Truly then nothing would be
beyond us.
Of course a transpersonalist like Ken Wilber
(1995), working from the more inclusive spiritual
monism of Plotinus and Vedanta, rightly labels all
such cognitive and neuropsychological approaches as a
“subtle reductionism”—or worse—since they falsely
subordinate the primacy of direct experience to mate-
rialism. Yet our civilization, for good or ill, is based on
science and technology, and likely to remain so.
Accordingly, scientific research on absorption and the
neurophysiology of spiritual experience are the cutting
edge of an inevitable interface of science and religion
that will not go away. On the constructive side, that
will involve attempts to assimilate the numinous to a
broadly pragmatic and humanist perspective, in part
conserving classical spiritual traditions in re-stated
forms. Yet in so doing, as a culture, do we not also face
some new equivalent of the Gnostic dilemmas of dual-
ism and spiritual inflation? Transpersonal psychology
is necessarily at risk of unintentionally stumbling into
a post-Nietzschean spirituality that is both “human all
too human” and “beyond good and evil.” And we can-
not simply wish that away in the name of a higher con-
sciousness that we also purport to “explain.”
Conclusions
Put otherwise, our era of a physical science, now
including the human brain, primarily values an “objec-
tivity” that has inevitably consigned “spirituality” to a
“consciousness” generally regarded as a mere and residual
“subjectivity.” This implicit understanding of a purely
immanent deity split off from a more objective reality
remains inescapably dualistic. This is a Gnostic dual-
ism of spirit and world inverted, but with the same
need for pneumatic high absorbers to escape—an
escape now that must go “inward” rather than
“upward.”
True, the more completely realized mysticisms,
along with the later William James and later Jung,
show that if a pure phenomenology of immediate
experience is carried far enough, it reveals conscious-
ness itself as something all-inclusive—the thatness or
suchness of James (1912) and Buddhism, Heidegger’s
Being, and Jung’s psychoid dimensions, equally basic
to mind and matter. The later Jung collaborated with
the physicist Wolfgang Pauli (Meier, 2001) in suggest-
ing that the presence of the same dynamic patterns in
consciousness and quantum physics make world and
consciousness ultimately indistinguishable—a view
also implied in the organicist philosophy of
Whitehead (1929). Here may well be a way forward
for a contemporary experiential spirituality that will
not be falsely inflating and antinomian. After all, if a
mathematical faculty of the brain can intuit principles
of nature years before they can have any actual scien-
tific application, which as Penrose (1997) points out is
a widely overlooked mystery, why should not a spiritual
faculty intuit its own equally mysterious objectivity?
It may be true that if we go far enough “in” we
come “out” again, but the passage was never easy or
automatic, and especially so in an era where conscious-
ness is a logically residual category. So for the forsee-
able future we are stuck with a science and humanism
purporting to explain and so encompass a sense of the
sacred that itself phenomenally encompasses and con-
textualizes our humanity. The core of the numinous
for Otto and James is an immediate response—with
acceptance and surrender—to that which is utterly
beyond our control—creation, life, and death. Yet our
civilization acts on the premise that all is potentially
under our control. There is a cultural collision here
that can only work itself out very very gradually.
Heidegger (1962) understood the core of numi-
nous experience as a direct awareness of Being as such,
in its inherent mystery, a view also basic to the spiritual
psychology of Almaas (1988). Yet Heidegger regarded
our era as “too late for God and too early for Being”—
since for us Being is still something primarily for our
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worldly utilization rather than for a more primary con-
templation for its own sake and ours. Any shift from
worshiping a creator God—also implicated by omis-
sion or commission in Auschwitz, mass starvations,
and Bin Laden—to the openness and letting-be of
Being seems destined to remain incomplete and partial
in our time.
After the New York Trade Towers attack it took
over three hours for the phone lines to clear enough so
that I could learn that my Manhattan-based son had
been nowhere near the disaster site. But I could not
bring myself to thank God since that same God had
not spared all those other sons and daughters. That
seemed monstrous, and so there was the sudden real-
ization that I had no one to thank. “Thy will be done”
implied a will and intention, and by implication a des-
perate begging, that seemed grotesque. Yet despite
years of meditation and spiritual practice, I was equally
distant from any Buddhist acceptance or Heideggerian
Gelassenheit/releasement. I bore no resemblance to a
Taoist sage, nor did I want to. Knowing better than
God, I was happy to be psychically inflated, if that is
what it was theologically, and a dualist who simply
wanted certain people dead as soon as possible. For
me, the God of Creation had obviously got it very
wrong and so seemed closer to Ialdabaoth, Jung’s
antinomian Yahweh in his Answer to Job, or a funda-
mentalist Satan left to preside over human history.
Plotinus’ critique of the Gnostics was correct, but
most of his contemporaries remained within dualist
and partial spiritualities. This seems equally true today.
Certainly mainstream transpersonalists may view the
spiritual metapathologies I am herein describing as
“Gnostic dilemmas” as instances of a pre-trans fallacy,
confusing ego-transcending unitive states with pre-ego
dynamic conflicts, and supposedly easily identified
and avoided. However, any naturalistically understood
inner-worldly mysticism of the future, unfolding in
our very material and self-aggrandizing culture, will
continue to face an inherent interpenetration of tran-
scendent states of consciousness and the
narcissistic/schizoid conflicts that can cyclically lead
back and forth into each other (Almaas, 1988). It is
not just Nietzsche, Jung, Heidegger, and Maslow who
oscillated between consciousness expansion and
despairing futility, and who remained caught within a
confusion of self and ego. Nonduality seems far more
frequently talked than walked. Such issues may be
intrinsic to any experiential spirituality but they are all
but pervasive, and largely unconscious, in the this-
worldly transpersonalism of the modern and post-
modern West.
End Notes
1. This is an expanded version of a presentation to the
Analytical Psychology Society of Western New York,
November, 2001. I thank Douglas MacDonald for
several clarifying suggestions.
2. See Piedmont (1999) for a similar treatment of
major religious figures
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